The Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2: Restructuring by Kenneth A. Froot
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Transition in Eastern Europe, Volume 2, The
Volume Author/Editor: Olivier Blanchard, Kenneth Froot, Jeffrey Sachs,
eds.
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-05662-7
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/blan94-3
Conference Date: February 26-29, 1992
Publication Date: January 1994
Chapter Title: Foreign Direct Investment in Eastern Europe: Some Economic
Considerations
Chapter Author: Kenneth A. Froot
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c6729
Chapter pages in book: (p. 293 - 318)17  Foreign Direct Investment 
in Eastern Europe: Some 
Economic Considerations 
Kenneth A. Froot 
With the radical transformation of East European economies has come a wave 
of interest  in inward foreign direct investment (FDI). In the past two years, 
host countries have adopted completely new legal frameworks as well as insti- 
tutions and agencies to encourage and approve of foreign investments. On the 
demand side, surveys suggest that almost two-thirds of multinational firms are 
interested  in  investing  directly  in  Eastern  Europe.  Indeed,  firms  initially 
showed a keen interest in “beating out the competition” by attempting to invest 
there first. Some observers became highly optimistic that foreign direct invest- 
ment inflows would soon be sufficient to fund large current account deficits. 
Now that the initial euphoria on both  sides has died down, countries and 
Western companies have scaled back their expectations. In spite of their in- 
creased interest in FDI, Western companies have on average invested relatively 
small dollar amounts. While the number of investments and joint ventures with 
foreigners for all of Eastern Europe has risen extremely rapidly to over 10,000, 
the  average  dollar  amount  per  investment  remains  very  small-about 
$150,000. The difficulties of setting up the investment and the uncertain status 
and direction of the transformation programs have led companies to slow the 
pace of entry and to downsize their expected participation. Today, it is hard to 
imagine that FDI will provide a major net source of funds to these countries in 
the near future. A more realistic view is that FDI’s major financial contribution 
to Eastern Europe is to be one of intermediation rather than inflow. 
It is undoubtedly true that the host countries of Eastern Europe badly need 
the technology, Western organizational experience, and financial depth and in- 
termediation services that foreign companies bring.  Yet  the entry of  foreign 
firms is also greeted with distrust-not  unlike that seen in other countries that 
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have  experienced bursts  in foreign  investment.  There  are often-heard com- 
plaints that foreigners purchase assets at fire-sale prices, taking advantage of 
inexperienced or corrupt government bureaucrats or managers. Because it is 
frequently necessary  to negotiate with  former Communists  and government 
apparatchiks, there is a sense of complicity between the worst parts of the old 
order and newer foreign entrants. Furthermore, foreigners often displace or are 
insensitive to original stakeholders in Eastern firms. Many argue that the ac- 
tions of local domestic owners would be more in line with social interests than 
are the actions of  foreigners. For example, foreign owners may be less con- 
cerned with the level of  unemployment in a certain municipality than would 
be local (domestic) stakeholders. And there may well be short-run social and 
political gains to preserving employment and smoothing needed labor market 
adjustments over time. 
The experience thus far with FDI has intensified the discussion of how best 
to get foreigners involved in the privatization process. One view is that foreign 
ownership should be explicitly limited and regulated by government, as in the 
case of, say, the Czechoslovak banking sector. Under this view, needed knowl- 
edge of Western technology, organizational skill, and business practice is to be 
purchased by  domestics in fee-for-service kinds of  agreements. In practice, 
many countries have already found that there is no shortage of Western experts 
ready to give advice on these matters. However, it is not clear that experts’ 
interests are always adequately aligned with those of their advisees. 
A second view is that foreigners-like  domestic investors-ought  to be en- 
couraged to participate in auctions and that these auctions should either be part 
of  the primary privatization process or take place after privatization occurs in 
the secondary market. In such a case, there would be little specialized treat- 
ment of foreign bidders, and competition, as the argument goes, would occur 
quite naturally between them. The highest bid would win. The difficulty here 
is that, in practice, little foreign competition  actually tends to emerge. And 
auctions are easily subverted when there are few truly competing bidders- 
the highest bid may be a very low bid indeed. As I discuss below, even auctions 
that are highly competitive ex ante are, in the context of Eastern Europe, likely 
to be very imperfectly competitive ex post. 
A third  and very  different model, one that is currently being pursued by 
Germany’s Treuhandanstalt, is to involve a governmental  agency directly in 
asset  sales  and  restructuring.  The activities  of  identifying  and  advertising 
assets, soliciting bids for their use, and then aiding in their restructuring and 
ultimate sale to foreign buyers might all be taken on by such an agency. Indeed, 
the Treuhand frequently uses whatever bargaining power it has to negotiate 
conditions  on payment,  current and future employment  levels, the range of 
required production activities, and investment expenditures. It is not so inter- 
ested in selling rapidly at the best available prices. 
While the Treuhand’s example is in many ways unsuitable for the rest of 
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government involvement in the privatization process specifically with respect 
to foreigners.  Effective competition in foreign purchases may be limited to 
such a degree that government involvement is needed to improve competition 
and/or negotiate for a better deal from society’s perspective. In these circum- 
stances, privately run auctions may by themselves be a poor means of redistrib- 
uting control to foreigners. Governments can take (and have taken) a number 
of steps to protect against this outcome by intervening in the privatization pro- 
cess. But these steps also come with costs-any  interventionist strategy that 
gives discretion to government authorities is subject both to possible adminis- 
trative lags and to corruption. 
The story of  Poland’s brief  encounter with  sectoral privatization  demon- 
strates many of these points. The sectoral approach evolved ostensibly out of 
the need to identify and characterize assets and provide information to a class 
of interested foreign buyers. Undertaking one sector at a time seemed to econo- 
mize on the costs of research, of finding interested parties, and of informing 
the parties about the assets. It also allowed for the trading of certain employ- 
ment and investment guarantees in return for ownership. For much of  1991, 
sectoral privatization was expected to become a major track in Poland’s priva- 
tization program. But the effort now seems to have failed, partly because it was 
moving too slowly, but, more important,  because of the possibilities for and 
suspicions of corruption throughout the program. This kind of handicap, from 
which the Treuhand does not  suffer, will be a problem  for every other East 
European country. 
This paper argues that the treatment of foreign investment is an important 
consideration in the initial design of privatization programs. I look at how for- 
eigners can be paired efficiently and competitively with assets and conclude 
that governments may need to intervene in the foreign privatization process in 
several ways. First, the terms on which sales to foreigners take place can be 
improved (relative to the terms of sales to domestics) by disseminating infor- 
mation  on individual  assets and sectors, by  promoting  FDI through various 
bilateral and multilateral agencies and rules-based approaches, and by clarify- 
ing, codifying, and enforcing domestic property rights. 
As it will take time to do these things, foreign investment may often be 
encouraged too hastily. That is, a sequencing of foreign involvement to follow 
domestic privatization may be desirable.  Such a delay in foreign investment 
would give domestic owners and the government time to disseminate informa- 
tion and provide for a relatively high level of competition in sales to foreigners. 
In addition, this sequencing would require foreigners to wrest control from a 
number of private holders.  Such transactions  are more likely to give greater 
bargaining power to domestics and less likely to be perceived as corrupt than 
similar transactions that involve only the government and a foreigner. 
The advantages of  slowing foreign investment do not, however, imply that 
domestic privatization should be slowed. Firms or assets that are intended for 
sale to foreigners can be rapidly privatized to domestics (with certain control 296  Kenneth A. Froot 
rights being retained by the government) as the government-led process of in- 
formation collection and dissemination begins. Governments therefore might 
be involved in actively delaying or restricting foreigners’ initial participation 
in direct investment while working to establish the conditions for active foreign 
competition at a later date. 
The next section outlines the evolution of (primarily) the Polish treatment 
of foreign investors and argues that this evolution, however flawed it may be, 
can be interpreted as a response to the naturally low initial levels of foreign 
competition  for domestic assets. Section  17.2 discusses various factors that 
help determine foreign valuations of  domestic assets. Section  17.3 then turns 
to a more analytic examination of country bargaining power in the process of 
selling assets that are costly to learn  about. The point is to see how  costly 
learning affects the level of foreign competition and to explore various selling 
and sequencing mechanisms that might help improve seller bargaining power. 
Section 17.4 offers conclusions. 
17.1  Recent Developments in Poland 
Poland that affect foreign investment and the terms on which it takes place. 
17.1.1 
This section describes very briefly some of the important developments in 
Changes in the Regulatory Framework 
The treatment of FDI in Poland is in the process of evolving from an inter- 
ventionist  and discretionary system toward a rules-based framework. Prior to 
the  1988 Joint Venture Law (which along with the  1991 Foreign Investment 
Law continues to regulate foreign investments in Poland), FDI into Poland was 
highly restricted.  Foreign participation  was limited to firms with fewer than 
200 employees, and there were severe restrictions on profit repatriation, use of 
foreign exchange, and export and import activity. Together, the 1988 and 1991 
laws removed virtually all these restrictions. In addition, the 1991 law removed 
completely the  1988 law’s application and approval processes (the 1988 law 
itself  liberalized these processes)  and eliminated  the regulatory authority  of 
the Foreign Investment Agency (FIA).’ 
The Polish FIA was abolished in part because it appeared that the discretion- 
ary nature of its approval process actually hindered FDI. As this process was 
highly  bureaucratic  in  nature,  the  true  requirements  for approval  often  re- 
mained  vague  and  uncertahz This discouraged  foreigners  from proposing 
deals in the first place. Furthermore, the uncertainties associated with approval 
were  widely understood  to create opportunities  for corruption.  Bureaucrats 
generally have an interest in creating the appearance of uncertainty in order to 
make their authority more valuable to applicants. The perceived opportunities 
1. For additional details on the foreign-investment laws in Poland, see Spar (1991) 
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for impropriety created fears among the FIA's  staff of taking the lead on indi- 
vidual deals-a  completed deal was likely to be accused of  being a corrupted 
deal. The result was that no one on the Polish side wanted to pursue investment 
approval aggressively. Thus, to remove the discretionary nature of the process 
and to emphasize the importance of rules, the FIA was dissolved. 
The evolution of tax policy is another example of the movement toward a 
rules-based approach. In the aftermath of the political changes in Poland, tax 
holidays were offered in the attempt to attract foreign investors. However, these 
benefits often took the form of tax competition with other East European coun- 
tries (so they had a beggar-thy-neighbor  aspect to them) and in any case did 
not  stimulate  foreign  investment. Indeed, surveys  show that  many  investors 
view  negatively  programs that meddle with foreign-investment  taxation  be- 
cause of their discretionary nature. Foreign investors are often more comfort- 
able being treated symmetrically with other host-country companies, even if it 
involves higher initial rates of taxation. Indeed, the 1991 law requires symme- 
try between foreign and domestic company taxation. 
This movement away from discretionary bureaucratic  decision making to- 
ward a legalistic rules-oriented system is evident in other countries as well. In 
many cases, detailed regulation of businesses (mandated by early legislation 
on direct investment) was carried out by low levels of the bureaucracy. Regula- 
tion was often perceived to be capricious and in some cases was even of dubi- 
ous legal status. For example, Soos (1991) argues that the Model Joint Venture 
Statute issued by the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Trade contained prescrip- 
tions whose legality could easily have been questioned. This, combined with 
the many unpublished ministry directives, magnified the sense of caution with 
which foreigners approached Romania. 
Overall, Poland and other countries have endeavored to lower the costs of 
foreign investment by moving to a simpler, more transparent rules-based sys- 
tem with less emphasis on bureaucratic intervention. In many cases, the laws 
and regulations have come to resemble those common in the West, particularly 
the EC (examples include recent tax codes, accounting principles, bank guar- 
antees, etc.), which helps lower costs of  adjusting to Poland. 
17.1.2  Changes in the Methods of Foreign Privatization 
Alongside the basic legal changes associated with FDI, the Polish govern- 
ment has sought several means of marketing and selling domestic enterprises 
to foreigners. The main responsibility for this effort resides with Poland's Min- 
istry of Privatization. The ministry is divided into three sections: capital priva- 
tization  (under  which  firms  are commercialized);  liquidation  (under which 
firms are legally dissolved, allowing for their piecemeal sale); and mass priva- 
tization (under which a yet-to-be-created group of mutual funds will distribute 
shares to citizens). Many of the transactions involving foreigners are joint ven- 
tures, which may form in the aftermath of a liquidation or through the capital 
privatization track. In addition, foreign firms purchase assets in trade sales or 298  Kenneth A. Froot 
Table 17.1  Joint Ventures, 1989-91 
~ 
Poland  Czechoslovakia  Romania  Hungary  Bulgaria 
1989  867  22  5  180  30 
I990  2,799  1,550  1,502  4,400  I40 
1991:l  4,000  1,318  2,665  2,420  366 
~ 
Source: Economist, 2 I  September 1991. 
IPOs (initial public offerings), which are alternative outcomes under the capital 
privatization program. 
While joint ventures  are the predominant  form of  foreign  investment by 
number, they are typically small transactions. By June 1991,  there were already 
4,350 joint-venture permits issued by the Foreign Investment Agency, but the 
average value of  the total capital (of which any foreign contribution  is part) 
was only about $150,000.’ Table 17.1 reports the number ofjoint ventures in 
several countries through the first quarter of  1991. Table 17.2 shows the loca- 
tion of the foreign investors involved in joint ventures as well as the percentage 
of equity owned by foreigners. 
While there was a good deal of excitement with joint ventures initially, that 
excitement has waned. In some respects, joint ventures do as much to hinder 
as to help the privatization effort. First, the terms on which foreigners enter are 
often perceived to be overly generous. The Polish Main Statistical Office re- 
ports that the average rate of return on total capital for joint ventures in  1990 
was 86 percent.  In many cases, foreigners’  rate of return  was much  higher 
because foreign ownership positions are frequently obtained in return for tech- 
nology andor relatively small infusions of liquidity. To  see this, we note that 
the average foreign financial contribution was about half the book value of the 
equity that foreigners received in return and that their share of total equity has 
averaged around 60  percent. Thus, an average foreign investor who contributed 
$30.00 would receive 60 percent of a firm with $100 in net worth. On average, 
one year later this venture had a net worth of $186, of which the foreign share 
was $1 12, a return of  almost four times the initial investment of $30.00. Even 
with such high payouts, Polish firms often end up competing with each other 
for access to foreign resources, with the result that the transactions take place 
at prices that are probably close to domestic reservation values. Czechoslova- 
kia and Hungary have had similar experiences with joint ventures4 Increas- 
ingly, there is concern that the joint-venture process leaves the country with 
little bargaining power. 
A second reason  that joint ventures are viewed  ambiguously  is that  they 
3. For more comprehensive data on Polish joint ventures, see Maslankiewicz (1991). 
4. A commonly cited Hungarian example of underpriced selling to foreigners is that of a large 
light-bulb-producing firm in Hungary that was sold to one foreign group and then resold almost 
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usually do not aid in the attempt to rationalize an industry’s portfolio of assets. 
Naturally, foreigners pick the assets with which they would like to work. Be- 
cause these assets are frequently part of a larger firm, the enterprise must liqui- 
date in order to sell specific assets to the joint venture. In these circumstances, 
the government is left with the least-desirable assets and potentially explosive 
political problems (shutdowns of the only factory in a one-shop town, environ- 
mental cleanup, etc.). In the short run, there is a wedge between private and 
social values that arises from unemployment of resources (and all its associated 
political consequences). If the host country had greater bargaining power with 
the foreign entity, it would be able to require that the new venture deal with 
these problems. 
Partly in response to these disadvantages to joint ventures, the capital priva- 
tization program began during 1991 actively to promote its “sectoral” approach 
to privatization. This approach briefly experienced a limited degree of success. 
Basically, the sectoral approach involves the identification and ultimate study 
of some 300 sectors across the economy. The basic plan is that in each sector 
a consultant is to be brought on to (1) identify companies operating in a given 
sector and analyze their viability and potential profitability, (2)  assemble and 
prepare for dissemination the sectoral information and analysis, and (3) aid in 
the process of auctioning off the sectoral firms to interested foreigners. Each 
consultant is compensated through a retainer fee plus a contingency fee if the 
firms are successfully sold. 
So far, approximately thirty-five sectoral studies are either in process or have 
already been completed. The means of choosing industries  has so far been 
reactive: when a foreigner indicates a desire to purchase a firm, the Ministry 
of  Privatization  initiates  a  sectoral  study.  This typically  takes  about  three 
months to complete, not  substantially  longer than a more narrowly focused 
bid evaluation. 
The sectoral study serves several purposes.  First, it gives the Ministry  of 
Privatization representatives a reasonable basis for understanding the value of 
the assets and evaluating the offer. Second, it collects information on all similar 300  Kenneth A. Froot 
facilities in Poland. This is often of use to bidding firms, which usually would 
not otherwise be able to consider a broad spectrum of alternative investments. 
It also forms the basis for a wider marketing effort, in which investment bank- 
ers and consultants  advertise the assets to a wider audience.  Third,  the in- 
creased publicity generates enough competition  to allow the pilot firm (and 
usually several others in the sector) to be sold off in an auction process. Auc- 
tions are characterized  by  reasonable levels of competition  and also provide 
negotiating opportunities  for the Polish government to adjust the sale terms 
based on deviations between private and social values (i.e., employment and 
investment guarantees can be negotiated). 
Sectoral studies would  seem to economize on the costs of accomplishing 
foreign investment. In addition to analyzing  the assets and publicizing  their 
sales, they create a safety net for firms involved in the auction process-losing 
bidders begin negotiations on another firm in the industry immediately after 
an auction ends. This goes a long way  toward conserving on the effort that 
foreigners must expend to learn about and acquire assets in Poland. 
Sectoral privatizations also help improve the host country’s bargaining posi- 
tion with foreign firms. The likelihood is much higher that foreigner investors 
will be bidding against one another, and the possibility of foreign firms playing 
one host-country firm off against another is eliminated. The Ministry of Priva- 
tization is therefore in a better position to negotiate labor contracts, new invest- 
ment guarantees, and other foreign “investment” requirements that (arguably) 
have high public returns for Poland. 
Finally,  sectoral  privatizations  help generate a  game plan  even  for those 
firms that do not sell. That is, this approach to privatization usually  involves 
some degree of simultaneous restructuring. Remaining firms (which are usu- 
ally smaller) can be led through some sort of MBO (management buyout) pro- 
cess. Before letting go, however, the Ministry of Privatization can help ratio- 
nalize  their  operations  and  direct  their  operations  into  different  “niche” 
markets.s  This  process  helps  guarantee that  the  postprivatization  industry 
structure  has capacity  smoothly  distributed  across  various products.  While 
competitive forces would ultimately achieve this type of industry structure (or 
do even better), these forces may be weak at first.h 
There  is  also  the  argument  that  the  negotiating  process  and  direct 
government/foreign-investor contact required to make the sectoral approach 
work partly diffuses foreign perceptions of the costs of poorly defined property 
rights. To some extent, foreigners are educated in the process about the exact 
status of  these rights. But perhaps more important,  as the situation is fluid, 
5. For example, in the detergent and soap sector, individual remaining firms were directed into 
hotel soaps and hospital soaps, respectively. 
6. Such activities by  the government have a ring of  “industrial policy” to them and are often 
(rightly) criticized by  economists in  the case of  the United States. However, in East European 
countries, the usual presumption that the existing allocation of capacity is nearly optimal obviously 
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companies gain contacts within the government that understand their interests 
and keep them appraised of changes. 
Initially, observers were critical of the sectoral approach, saying that it would 
repeatedly flood the market with waves of very similar companies. As a conse- 
quence, many were  skeptical that the  approach could improve host-country 
bargaining power, and the expectation was that prices would be low. However, 
this does not seem to have been the case thus far. In the recent sale of assets in 
the detergent sector, for example, the Ministry of Privatization received sales 
prices that were 2.5 times higher per ton of capacity (for smaller, somewhat 
less efficient firms) than did the Czechs, who have relied primarily on joint 
ventures. In addition to the higher prices, the auctions help lend an air of legiti- 
macy to the selling process, creating a structure that promotes (what at least 
appear to be) arm’s-length transactions. 
Another criticism has been that the sectoral approach slows down the priva- 
tization process and takes energy away from the mass privatization effort. To 
the extent that this is true, the diversion must be balanced against the value of 
the information generated by the sectoral studies. I discuss alternative methods 
of combining mass privatization and sectoral studies in later sections. 
But the sectoral approach’s major problem-and  the reason for its very re- 
cent demise-has  been the opportunities for corruption that it affords. Consul- 
tants  and  staff  were  given  considerable  discretionary  powers.  By  working 
closely with individual companies and groups of assets, and by virtue of their 
power to pursue “applied” industrial policies, consultants and staff often struck 
deals that were difficult for outsiders to scrutinize. (Indeed, there are accusa- 
tions that files containing details of agreed-on deals have disappeared.) Germa- 
ny’s Treuhandanstalt has not fallen victim to these perceptions, partly because 
of the integrity of the German system. 
In sum, Poland has made dramatic changes both in the legal basis for foreign 
investment and in the way in which enterprises are sold to foreigners. Some of 
these changes (e.g., the emphasis on the sectoral approach to privatization) 
can be interpreted  as helping increase domestic bargaining  power via-8-vis 
foreigners. All are at least partly driven by the need to lower the costs of for- 
eigners learning about and investing in doing business in Poland and to raise 
foreigners’ reservation prices for investing. 
In the wake of the sectoral approach’s demise, it is useful to remember that 
the earlier FDI tracks (e.g., joint ventures) were also not altogether desirable. 
It may be wise for Poland to make foreign investors wait for access and in the 
meanwhile spur on the progress of the mass privatization program for domes- 
tics. After these privatizations  are completed, there would be room for a re- 
vamped sectoral approach, which could help market privately owned firms to 
foreigners. The informational advantages of the sectoral approach could in this 
way be retained,  but, in these circumstances, the possibilities for corruption 
would be reduced,  as private owners would be the primary  counterparty in 
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17.2  Foreign Reservation Values 
Next I turn to the puzzle of why foreign purchase prices appear to be so low 
in the first place. In general, one would expect foreigners to value East Euro- 
pean assets far more highly than do East Europeans. In this section, I briefly 
discuss several of the determinants of foreign reservation values as well as the 
potential for policy-based measures to affect them. In the next section, I dis- 
cuss the issue of foreign versus domestic bargaining power and how the design 
of the privatization process affects that power. 
The simplest view of foreign reservation values is that they are generated 
by  what foreigners  would earn by  acquiring East European operations.  The 
overwhelmingly obvious presumption is that foreigners have better technology, 
more comprehensive experience with doing business in a market-based econ- 
omy, better knowledge of and relations with suppliers and distributors, better 
risk-sharing capabilities, and much greater financial strength.’ All else equal, 
these advantages should translate into a tendency for foreigners to pay more 
for East European assets than do domestic residents. 
Foreigners may also be willing to pay more than  domestics because they 
perceive an option value to establishing a “toehold’ in the East European mar- 
ket. The aforementioned  advantages that Westerners have are most valuable 
when the domestic economy turns out to be robust and grows rapidly. In such 
states, foreigners will be in a better position to expand sales and production 
rapidly than domestic firms that face capital and managerial talent constraints. 
To the extent that the level of uncertainty about these economies is high, this 
expansion option may be quite valuable. 
Surveys of foreign investor sentiment suggest that this option value is im- 
portant. Collins and Rodrik (1991) conducted a survey of multinational busi- 
ness  focusing  on  attitudes  toward  investing  in  Eastern  Europe.  Businesses 
seemed to perceive that current investments gave them the ability to “beat out 
the competition” and “get to the market first”; indeed, these benefits of invest- 
ment were ranked well above the benefits associated with low costs of produc- 
tion and a relatively  skilled work force. Such perceptions  seem to reflect the 
possibility that first-comers derive disproportionately large benefits from mar- 
ket access in certain states of the world and that, in these states, they will be in 
a privileged position to increase profits.* 
However, not all forces tend to drive foreign reservation values above those 
7. Naturally, financial strength would not matter in a world with perfect capital markets-i.e., 
markets in which firms do not face informational asymmetries and agency problems in their use 
of external financing. However, once such distortions exist, financial strength can be a source of 
competitive advantage. For an example of how this general  idea can be applied to foreign direct 
investment, sce Froot and Stein (1991). 
8. To make sense of this story, one must also posit some form of barriers to entry at later stages. 
Such barriers could come from steep learning curves associated with the unique aspects of doing 
business  in East European countries. For an example of a study that provides evidence of similar 
kinds of dynamic learning, see Teece (1976). 303  Foreign Direct Investment in Eastern Europe: Some Economic Considerations 
of  domestic entities.  For example, foreigners  may  suffer disproportionately 
from certain changes in policy, such as restrictions on dividend and profit repa- 
triation, expropriation, controls on moving goods or foreign exchange across 
borders, etc. A political backlash against foreign involvement could easily mo- 
tivate such policy changes (note the tenor of the discussion surrounding the 
relatively meager FDI inflow into the United States). This will be a particular 
problem if foreigners  are held publicly responsible  for poor macroeconomic 
performance or for firing workers at nonviable plants. 
The penalty to foreign valuation created by the possibility of asymmetrical 
government policies can be mitigated in two ways. First, the government can 
take steps to negotiate contracts with foreign firms that  stipulate how many 
workers must be employed, how  much  additional  investment must be done 
over time, etc. Such contracts can help align private and social values. This is 
valuable to the country because it helps internalize the externalities associated 
with unemployment. 
Second, governments may also endeavor to accomplish certain facets of the 
restructuring  that foreigners  would  otherwise  have to undertake  themselves. 
This is again reminiscent of  the Treuhandandstalt’s attempts to undertake sig- 
nificant  restructuring  before  privatization.  Preprivatization  restructuring  can 
help guarantee that the foreign buyer will not be held responsible for the criti- 
cisms associated with plant shutdowns. Such a program may help countries 
precommit to eliminating certain forms of political risk from foreign invest- 
ment, thereby ensuring that the interests of the government do not diverge radi- 
cally from those of the foreign firm (which is when expropriation is most likely 
to occur). 
It is sometimes argued that foreign reservation values are highest when the 
country is clearly committed to having a very high degree of foreign involve- 
ment (see, e.g., Wolfe 1991). The logic is that, in an economy with coordina- 
tion externalities, multiple equilibria can arise. If enough firms pursue high- 
investment policies,  then the country  will  experience rapid demand growth, 
which will in turn generate high returns on investment and support the initial 
high-investment policies. However, if firms pursue low-level investment strate- 
gies, then growth and returns  on investment are sufficiently low to make it 
unprofitable for individual firms to invest more aggre~sively.~ 
With this in mind, some have argued that greater foreign participation makes 
the high-investment equilibrium more likely. This is likely to be a useful in- 
sight, especially in cases where foreigners perceive systematically higher re- 
turns on investment than do domestic entrepreneurs because of technological 
or financial advantages. However, it may well be that domestically owned firms 
are better at resolving the coordination problem that creates the multiplicity in 
the first place. Foreign-owned  firms may make their decisions from all over 
the world and may not be particularly focused on the investment plans of other 
9. For an example of such a model, see Murphy, Shleifer, and Vishny (1989). 304  Kenneth A. Froot 
firms in a given local economy. Therefore, even in the presence of  multiple 
equilibria, it is not clear that greater levels of foreign involvement would cause 
higher growth.’O 
17.3  Selling Enterprises to Foreigners on Better Terms 
There are obviously a number of  good reasons why foreign and domestic 
entrepreneurs might have very different reservation values for East European 
enterprises and assets. But foreign reservation values are not the only-or  per- 
haps even the major-practical  concern in selling to foreigners. First of all, a 
country’s total return from selling to foreigners may be high even if the pecuni- 
ary receipts are low: domestic residents may gain valuable technology and ex- 
perience from a foreign presence in the economy. Some of the pecuniary re- 
turns may also come in the form of  employment and investment guarantees 
that are valued more highly by the country. Second, the pecuniary receipts will 
themselves depend on the bargaining power  of  the country and the foreign 
investor in addition to the foreigner’s reservation price. 
The ability of the country to extract bargaining gains will be important when 
there is little effective competition  among buyers.  And competition  will be 
inhibited by the presence of costs to potential bidders learning enough about 
enterprises (and about doing business in a country) to make bidding worth- 
while. Such “costs of entry” are likely to be substantial. 
A typical example comes from Sara Lee, Inc., which in mid-1990 was con- 
sidering importing and/or producing hosiery in the East. Sara Lee chose Hun- 
gary-arguably  the most promising and liberalized country for foreign invest- 
ors at the time-as  a potential  investment  site. But, after several trips by  a 
number of senior executives and their aids, Sara Lee remained uncertain about 
its ability to do business there. There was confusion about the company’s abil- 
ity to import materials and repatriate profits, about the rules for ownership, and 
about the role of the State Property Agency in arranging for purchases. These 
explorations ultimately did yield a venture that Sara Lee considered worth pur- 
suing-a  $60 million investment (5 l percent) in a Hungarian food company. 
But participation involved a complete reworking of Sara Lee’s food and hosiery 
strategy  in Eastern  and Western Europe. Learning about the peculiarities of 
doing business in Hungary and integrating that into Sara Lee’s overall strategy 
was costly. The whole process ate up far more top-executive  time than that 
typical for comparably sized investments.” 
Costly learning by foreigners can dramatically affect the terms under which 
East European assets should be expected to sell (if they sell at all). Reflecting 
their bias toward competition, economists usually envision some type of com- 
10. There is some empirical work that demonstrates a positive correlation between growth and 
I I. For more details, see Weiner (1990). 
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petitive auction mechanism for selling assets to foreigners. Regardless of the 
precise auction rules (Dutch, sealed-bid, English, etc.) and the distribution of 
information, it does not require many bidders to make the seller’s reservation 
price largely irrelevant to the bidding. For example, in an open-outcry English 
auction with two bidders with (at least privately) known valuations, an asset 
will sell at (just above) the second highest bidder’s valuation.12  It usually goes 
without  saying that competition  among bidders raises the seller’s bargaining 
power and the price the seller can expect to extract. 
However, this conclusion no longer holds once there are costs to learning 
about the asset’s value. The prospect of competition at the auction stage clearly 
disciplines a bidder’s incentive to learn about the asset in the first stage. In such 
instances, sellers may actually gain by eliminating potential bidders rather than 
encouraging them to participate. I provide an example of a bidding model be- 
low in which an increase in the number of bidders does not increase the com- 
petitiveness of the auction.I3 
The practical point here is not so much that East European governments or 
enterprises will want to discourage potential foreign bidders from exploring 
investments in their countries. Rather, it is that the returns to increasing the 
universe of potential bidders may be surprising low (unless of course there is an 
attempt to economize on the costs of bidder information). In addition, whereas 
highly “redeployable” assets are thought to have relatively high liquidation val- 
ues (redeployability implies a comparatively broadly based demand for a given 
asset), redeployable assets might be relatively more undervalued in actual East 
European  auction  sales, particularly  when  foreigners  are the buyers.  When 
there are costs to learning about value, having a large number of potential uses 
for the assets does not necessarily guarantee a high sales price.I4 The presence 
of costs to foreign bidding therefore strongly argues for more efficient infor- 
mation dissemination. Because this information is a public good, its dissemi- 
nation may be best accomplished by a governmental agency or trade organi- 
zation. 
17.3.1 
the number of bidders does not increase the seller’s bargaining power. 
Auctions with Costly Participation: An Example 
This subsection offers an example of  an asset sale in which an increase in 
Consider a simple two-stage process in which an asset is to be sold to the 
12. When bidders are imperfectly informed about an asset’s true value, they may use the seller’s 
reservation price (if it is known) in determining their own reservation prices. For a simple overview 
and further citations, see Milgrom (1989). 
13. Bidder elimination improves seller revenues in a number of models of both sequential and 
simultaneous bidding. In a sequential bidding model, an initial bidder may wish to make a preemp- 
tively high initial bid in order to ward off interest from other potential bidders. Fishman (1988) 
shows that, in such circumstances, the seller receives higher profits than when a preemptive bid 
does not occur and instead bidders compete in an auction. 
14. A number of authors have stressed that redeployability is critical for determining an asset’s 
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highest bidder. In the first stage, each of N risk-neutral bidders may spend an 
amount c to learn their valuation of the asset. In the second stage, those who 
spend c compete in an open-outcry  English  auction. The variable c can  be 
interpreted quite broadly as including the cost not only of learning about the 
specifics of an investment opportunity but also of general learning about the 
status of property rights and enforcement mechanisms in East European coun- 
tries. 
I start with the simplest situation in which individual bidder reservation val- 
ues contain only a common component,  vc.Is For now, I assume that it is com- 
mon knowledge that  vc. = 1. Bidders who pay the cost c are able to observe 
vc.Ih  It is common knowledge that the seller's reservation price,  v,, equals 1/2 
and that the seller has no bargaining power in situations of  bilateral negotia- 
tion: if only one bidder emerges with a reservation value greater than half, the 
sales price is the seller's reservation price. If more than one bidder arrives with 
a reservation value greater than half, then the sales price is equal to the realized 
common value, vc = 1. 
To get a sense for bidder strategies under these circumstances, note first that 
this example cannot support a pure-strategy bidding equilibrium. To  see this, 
suppose that all N  bidders decide to spend c and therefore to compete in the 
bidding. Competition in the auction will guarantee that the asset sells for a 
price of  one, reducing  to zero any expected gains from winning.  However, 
since bidders must pay c to participate, their ex ante expected profits are nega- 
tive. Individual bidders will therefore not wish to play, so the all-bidders-play 
outcome cannot be an equilibrium. Alternatively, it cannot be an equilibrium 
for bidders never to participate: if  no bidders spend c to participate, a single 
bidder would have the incentive to deviate by paying c < V2, thereby keeping 
the expected profits from the auction of  1/2  all to himself. 
The equilibrium  to this game involves a mixed  strategy, in which the nth 
bidder, with probabilitypn,  pays c and participates in the auction. (If no bidders 
arrive, the asset is not sold.) The nth bidder's expected profit from participating 
can then be expressed as 
In the symmetrical solution to the game, each bidder chooses the same proba- 
bility  of participating. Bidders will have an incentive to raise the probability 
with which they participate as long as expected profits are positive. As a result, 
expected profits in (1) are driven to zero, and the common probability of partic- 
ipation satisfies  (1 -  p)"- ' = ch,. Substituting,  the expected  profit,  T,  re- 
ceived by the seller is 
15. The results are not importantly affected by  whether 
16. A related example can be found in Spatt (1989). 
is known or random ex ante. I also 
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which is decreasing in N for  N >  1. That is, eliminating bidders from this game 
increases the expected profit to the seller. 
Essentially, bidders will participate only if they can expect to use the profits 
from winning the auction to amortize fully the costs of participating. All else 
equal, there must be less effective competition at the auction in order to justify 
the higher total learning costs associated with a larger number of bidders. (In 
the example above, this translates into a higher probability of  an individual 
bidder making it to the auction alone.) More generally, when participation is 
costly, greater competition ex ante can be sustained only by effectively guaran- 
teeing less competition ex post. 
Costs of Bidding 
There are several factors-besides  the number of bidders-that  help.deter- 
mine how “competitive” the selling-off process is likely to be. First, and most 
important, is the cost, c, of participating in the bidding. In the example above, 
if the costs of participation are removed altogether, then all N bidders partici- 
pate in the auction, and the seller nets with certainty a profit of  v, = 1. 
Bidding costs are particularly burdensome to expected seller profits because 
they  are borne  by  each player individually. In the bidding  game described 
above, suppose that the potential universe of bidders is ten. If there are no costs 
of participation, all ten bidders do bid with probability one, and the seller gets 
v,.  If, however, we introduce a cost of bidding equal to just 1 percent of  the 
expected gain from winning the auction (i.e., c/v, = .Ol), the probability with 
which bidders participate falls dramatically to .4. (Note that this implies that 
the expected number of participants in the auction is only four.) The addition 
of this 1 percent cost of bidding also lowers the seller’s expected profit by  5 
percent. Thus, even with small costs of entry, bidders compete in the auction 
much less frequently. This, in turn, has a relatively large negative effect on the 
competitiveness of the auction. 
The magnification effect of  small costs of  bidding on  seller profits im- 
plies that countries have a strong incentive to provide to all bidders informa- 
tion that is of common value. Continuing with the example above, if each bid- 
der needs to obtain the same set of information in order to participate, then 
the country could itself obtain  the information  for 1 percent of  the asset’s 
value. By making  this information public,  the expected auction price  rises 
by 5 percent-on  net the country saves itself four times the costs of informa- 
tion. 
Much of the learning about potential acquisitions in the East concerns the 
consumption of  a public good. Foreign firms repeatedly report how difficult 
and time consuming it is to sort out the rules of the game, to understand the 
status (current and future) of  property rights, and to determine who has the 
authority to do what. Simple promotional activities-such  as the Hungarian 
government’s early efforts to provide detailed information on large companies 
to major European banks, investment banks, and chambers of commerce or the 
Polish Ministry of Privatization’s activities of studying and promoting individ- 308  Kenneth A. Froot 
ual sectors-have  the potential to lower costs and increase the degree of com- 
petition facing foreign investors. 
Seller Reservation Values 
Because costs of  participation  make the  auction  mechanism  imperfectly 
competitive, auction revenues depend importantly on the reservation price of 
the seller. In cases where seller reservation values are low relative to those of a 
relatively small number of bidders, seller reservation values will be particularly 
important to expected auction revenues. 
It is important to clear up just what the seller’s reservation value means in 
this context. If the seller has the option to retain control of the asset, then the 
reservation value depends on the cash flows that the seller would have received 
by holding on. As has already been discussed, there are reasons to think that 
these present values might be low, especially relative to those of foreigners. 
But in Eastern Europe there are many instances in which the present value of 
cash flows under the holder’s control is irrelevant because the holder of the 
assets must sell. Even if the government and existing enterprises were able to 
manage the real assets of the economy in the coming years, the credibility of 
the transition to a decentralized market economy depends largely on the cen- 
tral authority’s ability to divest its holdings of assets. Forced selling to foreign- 
ers could be avoided if the privatization goes through with only limited initial 
foreign involvement.  In later stages, after firms have been privatized, the ur- 
gency to sell is reduced, and domestic reservation values will be higher. 
Clearly, if there are factors (other than holding value) that prompt the seller 
to divest, the seller’s reservation price need not equal the assets’ value under 
the seller’s control. These factors are evident in cases in which the government 
sells in response to political pressure. But they are also important in many other 
instances. Sellers of assets in Eastern Europe, whether they be governmental 
authorities or managers of firms or equityholders of recently privatized firms, 
often face severe liquidity constraints. They will view assets sales as a means 
of raising scarce cash. 
This latter point is important because, in Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslova- 
kia, the banking sector is extremely weak and securitization of assets (such as 
through public debt sales) is not likely to be practical for some time. Even if 
local banks are able to lend out domestically generated savings, credit alloca- 
tion  is likely to be poor. Recently  privatized firms, for example, will find it 
necessary to sell assets, not because the assets are not useful or productive, but 
because they either need funds to service existing debts or wish to fund even 
more productive investments. Various levels of  country governments, which 
will find it difficult to borrow for some time and which may not-or,  because 
of slow growth, should not-raise  taxes, will also have to resort to rapid asset 
sales. Thus, with the usual institutional sources of financial intermediation in 
such an  underdeveloped  state,  asset  sales become a disproportionately  im- 
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The distorted importance of asset sales in supporting basic financial inter- 
mediation  translates  into a  strong  downward  pressure on seller reservation 
prices. Such reservation values may be well below the value of the assets under 
the seller's control. 
Private Information and the Value of  Equity Retention 
In the example above, the only source of potential bidder profits comes from 
the weak bargaining position of the seller. This weakness was manifest in the 
assumption that the seller receives a (relatively low) reservation price if only 
one high-reservation-price  bidder  arrives  at the auction.  However, expected 
bidder profits do not generally reflect bargaining power alone-they  also re- 
flect any private information about value that the bidder may have. The pres- 
ence of private information increases the incentive for a given bidder to partici- 
pate. This occurs because the auction requires the winning bidder to pay only 
the reservation price of the second highest participant. The greater is the dis- 
persion  of private-information  values, the greater  is this source of expected 
bidder profits. 
Private information can be easily incorporated into the example above. Sup- 
pose that, instead of a common value, v,,  there is a private signal of value, v,,, 
n = 1, . . . ,  N,  which can take on the values of zero or one with equal probabil- 
ity."  By paying c, the nth bidder observes v,, and then competes in a second- 
price auction. The bidder enters the auction with probability p,,  and has a reser- 
vation price higher than the seller with probability pJ2.  Thus, expected bidder 
profits become 
(3) 
where 0 5 v, < 1 is the seller's reservation price. In the symmetrical equilib- 
rium, the common probability of participation is then 
(4) 
= 1 otherwise. 
The seller's profits are now 
(  -P+NP) 
22 
rrs = 1 -  vs -  (1 -  v,)  1 - - 
These results are similar to those above. The only real difference is that, 
with private information, the winning bidder expects to buy the asset at a price 
17. The binomial distribution is chosen here for simplicity only and has little qualitative signifi- 
cance for the results. In addition, none of  the results below are affected if we were to include both 
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below  his reservation value, even if there are other competing bidders. The 
possibility of positive expected profits means that sufficiently small (but posi- 
tive) costs will not deter bidders from participating-expected  profits can be 
strictly positive even when all N bidders participate with probability one. Thus, 
very small costs of bidding (in this case, c < 1/29  have no effect on the proba- 
bility of participation and therefore no effect on seller profits. However, once 
costs reach a level such that the expected  gains to a bidder from having the 
private information equal the costs of participation, c = 1/2N,  the situation dis- 
cussed above applies. That is, small additions to the cost of bidding have large 
effects on the competitiveness of the auction and therefore lead to large reduc- 
tions in the price that the seller can expect to receive. 
Clearly, once bidders have private information, the seller is at an informa- 
tional disadvantage. One way of overcoming this disadvantage-at  least par- 
tially-is  for the seller to retain a portion of the equity of the enterprise being 
sold. To  see this, suppose that there are two risk-neutral bidders with privately 
known  valuations,  v,  and v2, that are independent  draws  from a common- 
knowledge distribution. In an English auction format with open outcry and no 
costs of  bidding,  the  seller expects to receive the second  highest  valuation 
as the winning bid,  E[min(v,, vJ],  and  the  ith bidder,  i = 1, 2, expects to 
profit  by  E[max(v, -  vj,  O)].  By  selling  only  a  portion  of  the  asset,  the 
seller can extract some of the high-value bidder’s surplus. If the seller retains 
a  fraction  a of  the  asset,  the  seller’s  expected  profits  rise  to  become 
E[min(v,, v2)1 + aE[lv, -  v,ll. 
The use of  equity retention  to improve  seller revenue demonstrates  what 
Milgrom (1989) calls the “linkage principle,” which says that it pays the seller 
to link his returns to any piece of private information  the bidder  may have. 
Naturally, it is best if the linkage occurs with respect to something that is exog- 
enous to the  bidder’s  actions-otherwise,  there  can  be  a  moral  hazard  or 
principle-agent problem. For example, if the ultimate realization of  value de- 
pends on future bidder effort-which  are endogenous from the bidder’s per- 
spective-then  equity retention by the seller will act as a tax on bidder effort. 
All else equal, the presence of this tax will reduce the value of the asset. 
While the positive effects of equity retention on bidder revenue seem intu- 
itive enough, equity retention has a second, negative effect on revenue if there 
are costs of bidding. Greater seller expected profits come at the expense of 
expected bidder profits, and lower bidder profits reduce the ex ante incentives 
for bidder participation. The result is that equity retention lowers the average 
competitiveness of the auction, reducing the probability of participation from 
that given by equation (4) to 
= 1 otherwise. 311  Foreign Direct Investment in Eastern Europe: Some Economic Considerations 
Seller profits therefore rise to the extent that the seller retains a share a  of 
equity in the asset but fall to the extent that lower bidder profits reduce the 
competitiveness of the auction. It is easy to show that expected seller profits 
are now 
a(l - vs)Q(  2  1 -  ;)N-  ' 
Even though these two effects act in opposite directions, several unambiguous 
results emerge.  It is possible  to show that, for small costs of  participation, 
retention of equity by the seller typically raises profits. The reason is that eq- 
uity retention increases the perceived ex ante costs of bidding by a factor of I/ 
(1 -  a).  By making costs sufficiently small, the resulting anticompetitiveness 
effect can be made small as well. But, even as costs go to zero, the positive 
effect on seller profits of equity retention does not. Thus, with small costs of 
bidding, equity retention improves the position of the seller. 
Figure 17.1 helps us see the behavior of seller profits in these circumstances. 
The bold line represents profits from a direct auction with private bidder val- 
ues. The line is convex because (as is the case with common values above) 
relatively small costs have a disproportionately  large negative effect on seller 
profits. The larger the costs of participation become, however, the smaller is 
the effect on seller profits of a marginal increase in costs. The dotted line in 
0 
costs of bid participation 
-  no equity retained by seller  _._.  50 percent equity retained by seller 
Fig. 17.1 
an auction with private bidder valuations 
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the figure represents seller profits when part of  the equity is retained by  the 
seller. Note that equity retention mitigates the anticompetitive effects of costly 
participation when costs are small (relative, i.e., to expected bidder profits con- 
ditional on participating in the auction). When costs become large, however, 
the seller is made worse off if he retains some of the equity. Equity retention 
increases the ratio of bidding costs to bidding profits for given c;  the result is 
a lower threshold level of c at which bidders refuse to participate  with any 
positive probability.  The less equity  is retained,  the  smaller is the range in 
which equity retention leads to lower seller profits. 
As in the case with no private information, sellers can raise expected profits 
through the ex ante elimination of bidders, provided that c>  1/2N.  This is true 
regardless of whether the seller plans to retain a portion of the equity. However, 
once costs are small enough or there are few enough bidders (so that c<  1/29, 
bidder elimination is no longer in the seller’s interests. At this point, there are 
so few bidders that bidders expect to gain more from the bidding advantage 
conferred by  the private information than they expect to pay to obtain it (c). 
Thus, because expected bidder profits are not dissipated through competition 
or bidding costs, bidders participate with probability one. 
Figure 17.2 shows the effect on expected seller profits of an elimination of 
bidders. Figure 17.3 does the same when the seller is to retain half the asset’s 
equity. Note that, regardless of the number of bidders, equity retention raises 
seller profits for small relative costs of bidding. 
In spite of the potential theoretical benefits to equity retention, there are in 
practice a number of potential costs of such a policy. For assets that do not 
have legitimate private owners, complete divestment by  the government may 
0 
costs of bid participation 
-  number of potential competitors, N=10  -----  number of potential competitors, N=4 
Fig. 17.2  Expected seller profits from an auction with private valuations and 
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0  costs of bid participation 
-  number of potential competitors, N=10  -_-.-  number of potential competitors, N=4 
Fig. 17.3  Expected seller profits from an auction with private valuations and 50 
percent equity retention by the seller 
be a political goal. Minority equity retention by some form of centralized “de- 
velopment fund” is of questionable political viability. 
17.3.2  Two-step Sales to Foreigners 
It would seem that holders of East European assets face a dilemma in realiz- 
ing a high value when selling. The greater the share of the equity they retain, 
the more they expose themselves to political criticisms that privatization  has 
failed. Yet, by  selling a greater share, they suffer more from weak bargaining 
power and the imperfectness of  the auction competition. However, the costs 
and benefits implied by this trade-off are not immutably fixed-they  depend 
critically on who is selling the equity. In this subsection, I look at the ability 
of sellers to enhance their revenues by separating control from residual owner- 
ship and by selling the ownership of the assets in a two-stage process. 
The first point to note is that a country’s bargaining position can be strategi- 
cally strengthened if foreigners must buy shares from a large number of small 
investors. These investors will have the incentive to free-ride on any common- 
knowledge improvements in operations  and efficiency  that foreigners bring. 
Since individual shareholders do not view their behavior as pivotal in a foreign 
acquisition, they will sell into a foreign tender offer only if the price is that 
which they expect under foreign management.lE 
To take a simple example, suppose that, under existing management, an un- 
commercialized  East  European firm  is worth  100. Also,  suppose that  it is 
18. The point that the free-riding of  small  shareholders reduces a raider’s profits from taking 
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known that a foreign buyer could effect managerial and operational changes 
to make this firm worth 200 and that this amount is both observable and verifi- 
able by third parties. If the government (or the firm’s management) must bar- 
gain bilaterally with the foreign suitor, it can be expected to extract an amount 
between  100 and 200, say,  150. However, if the shares of  the firm are widely 
dispersed, a public offer by the foreign firm of  150 would not be sufficient to 
induce small investors to tender. Each small investor-who  perceives himself 
to have no effect on the offer’s success-would  reason that, by holding on, his 
shares would be worth 200, rather than the 150 received by tendering. That is, 
if investors are to tender their shares, they will demand in return the full value 
of  the firm under foreign control. The free-rider problem  therefore  gives to 
small investors credible bargaining strength. 
Many of the most popularly discussed privatization proposals include meas- 
ures for widespread  share distribution.  However, in most cases, these shares 
are envisioned to be held in blocks by a limited number of investors: invest- 
ment and pension funds, workers and management, some form of state devel- 
opment fund. These groups of investors are not exactly small, but holdings by 
even a limited number of investors will give the country much more bargaining 
power than would a single share owner. Greater bargaining power with foreign- 
ers may therefore be a little-stressed advantage of mass privatization  policies 
that emphasize broad share distribution. 
This advantage remains even if it is not practical to promote earnest foreign 
involvement quickly on reasonable terms. It takes time for the government to 
gather information and contact potential foreign bidders. However, even if the 
process of  engaging foreign  investors  is slow, there are benefits  to pushing 
quickly  ahead  with mass privatization.  These benefits  include  not  only the 
avoidance of ambiguities about ownership and control rights but also the abil- 
ity to negotiate better with foreigners when the time comes. Thus, a two-step 
approach  to firms  that  are ultimately  to be owned by  foreigners  may be  a 
good one. 
In many ways, the actual terms paid by foreign acquirers are not so important 
politically as are the means by which the terms are determined. That is, there 
is likely to be suspicion about the legitimacy of insider transactions involving 
only government representatives and the foreign acquirer. Arm’s-length trans- 
actions, or negotiated transactions in which representatives from the domestic 
firm also participate, would make corrupt transactions more difficult. 
The economics of two-step foreign acquisitions can be taken one step fur- 
ther, to say something about the voting power of the shares that the government 
ought to distribute to small investors. To see this, suppose that the foreign firm 
in the example above receives observable (but not verifiable) private benefits 
of 40 from controlling the enterprise. (This is in addition to the 200 in value 
that foreign control generates.) These private benefits can arise from perks to 
management, from the multinational’s increased ability to use transfer pricing 
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parent (e.g., greater familiarity with Eastern markets and with the process of 
doing business in the East, option value of  undertaking further investments, 
etc.). If the shares have full voting power (one share, one vote) and are initially 
distributed by the government to many different investors, the foreign firm will 
still succeed in acquiring the shares by making a tender offer of 200. In other 
words, small investors do not have bargaining power with respect to private 
benefits that accrue to the foreign firm. 
However, this is not the case for the host government (or the firm’s manage- 
ment). A central authority will have just as much bargaining power with re- 
spect to private benefits as it does with respect to verifiable benefits. So, in this 
example, it would make sense for the government to retain a “golden share” 
with special control privileges and to distribute nonvoting equity in the mass 
privatization stage. A foreign acquirer would then have to negotiate to obtain 
the golden  share while  acquiring at arm’s length nonvoting  shares. By  em- 
ploying this particular ownership/control structure, the host country will retain 
the full value of  the verifiable component of  foreign-firm  value as well as a 
share (say, 50 percent)  of  the private benefits  received  by  the foreign  firm. 
Thus, total host-country gains are 200 + 40/2 = 220-much  greater than the 
150 =  40/2 = 170 that would result from a negotiation  with the government 
for all the host-country firm’s equity. 
In practice,  such a negotiation  would let the government retain  its ability 
to negotiate  with foreign investors about future employment and investment 
spending. It may be that this form of expenditure by foreign firms has a rela- 
tively high social return so that it would be very costly for the government to 
give up its negotiating strength by selling all rights to enterprise control in the 
mass privatization phase. 
17.4  Conclusions 
This analysis of the behavior of country bargaining power leads to two types 
of prescriptions for encouraging FDI and improving the terms on which it takes 
place. First, it is clear that there are large returns to centralized efforts to collect 
and disseminate information about the assets and about how to operate them 
in the host country. If  borne by individual bidders, such costs-even  if  they 
are small-can  have large effects on the degree of foreign competition for 
domestic assets and on the revenues received by host countries. 
Second, if the information acquisition phase takes time, it may be useful to 
go ahead immediately with some form of mass privatization. Privatization may 
be best accomplished if done quickly. Furthermore, privatization places a sub- 
stantial number of  shares in private hands so that interested foreign investors 
must negotiate for shares or purchase them in arm’s-length transactions from a 
variety of private owners in addition to the government. This is likely to help 
guarantee better purchase terms and to contribute to a greater sense of fairness. 
To facilitate the government’s ability to dictate nonprice terms (such as em- 316  Kenneth A. Froot 
ployment and investment guarantees), it may be useful for the government to 
retain some form of  control through a golden share. Foreign investors would 
then have to negotiate for control while needing to tender for ownership of the 
economic up side. 
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Discussion Summary 
Pentti Kouri noted that, in practice, it is rare that there are too many foreign 
bidders in auctions of state assets. He criticized Froot’s emphasis on this spe- 
cial case. Kouri also critiqued Froot’s proposal for two-step sales to foreigners. 
Kouri said that the first step in this process, a rapid, wide-scale dissemination 
of equity to the general public, would severely restrict the government’s capac- 
ity to implement a sensible industrial policy. 
Kouri estimated that, in 1991, Eastern Europe and Russia jointly received 
approximately $1.5 billion dollars of FDI. Kouri said that this total was domi- 
nated  by  Czechoslovakia,  Hungary,  and  Poland,  each  of  which  recorded 
roughly $500 million of FDI. Kalman Mizsei and Murk Schaffer suggested that 
Kouri’s estimate for Hungary was too low. Mizsei said that Hungary received 
$1.2-$1.4  billion of FDI in 1991. Anders Aslund said that the 1991 FDI total 
for Eastern Europe and Russia was approximately  $2.5 billion. Aslund also 
estimated that 30,000 foreign investments and joint ventures have been under- 
taken so far, three times the estimate given in the paper. 
Simon Johnson noted that Western firms may learn about a business in East- 
ern Europe by sourcing from that firm. Western firms often use this knowledge 
to determine the potential profitability of investing in the Eastern firm. Johnson 
conjectured that this type of incidental information gathering reduces the cost 
of FDI for Western firms. 
Andrew Berg supported Froot’s proposal for two-stage sales to foreigners. 
Berg said that the government does not know enough about most state enter- 
prises to conduct an effective program of sales to foreigners. After mass priva- 
tization, firms would be sold by  private owners, who would probably have 
more knowledge about the asset. 
Olivier Blanchard wondered why the extremely low wages in Russia had 
failed to attract a significant amount of FDI. Kouri responded that the ambigu- 
ous political environment and a lack of  clarity in the laws on property rights 
have delayed the FDI process. Kouri also noted that, even after the political 
environment stabilizes and the laws are clarified, it will still take a substantial 
amount of time to complete the planninghegotiation  stages of most foreign 
investment projects. 
Geofley Carliner said that foreign firms could profitably invest in Russian 
firms that produce for the domestic Russian market. He noted that the foreign 
firms could repatriate their profits by purchasing the foreign exchange earned 
by the Russian natural resource export industry. Schaffer said that, unlike most 
of  the East European countries, Russia will face great difficulty developing 
strong manufacturing export industries. He emphasized that, even before the 
collapse of the CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance), East Euro- 
peans were not buying Russian manufactured goods. 
Aslund said that it is unlikely that FDI will generate substantial capital in- 318  Kenneth A. Froot 
flows to Eastern Europe and Russia during the next five to ten years. He noted 
that, historically,  most  liberalization  and macro stabilization  programs have 
been characterized  by  low levels of FDI during the first postreform decade. 
Aslund cited the cases of Spain and Mexico. He said that this kind of experi- 
ence is likely to be repeated in Russia, with a possible exception in the energy 
sector. Aslund also noted that relatively high levels of FDI may be realized in 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland because of the proximity  of the large 
European export market. 
Stanley Fischer supported the point that FDI will not play an important role 
in balance-of-payments financing in Russia and Eastern Europe. Fischer noted 
that Japan is currently the primary source of FDI and that most of Japan’s FDI 
activity is focused in East Asia. Fischer also observed that, in Russia, there is 
some internal resistance to FDI. For example, many  of  the bureaucrats  and 
managers who control the oil and minerals industries seem to believe that they 
can develop these assets without entering joint ventures with foreign firms. 
Finally, Fischer noted that the history of  FDI in developing countries suggests 
that  such deals work best when the FDI project  itself generates the foreign 
exchange that the investing firm can repatriate as profit. Hence, FDI tends to 
occur only in export  industries,  suggesting  that  FDI cannot be relied  on to 
restructure the overwhelming majority of  industrial enterprises that manufac- 
ture products for domestic markets. 
Jeffrey Suchs noted  that, in Poland, there is popular resistance to sales of 
public assets to foreign investors; the current level of FDI activity reflects these 
internal constraints.  However, there has not been  any political  resistance  to 
joint ventures between  private Polish firms and foreign firms. Hence, Sachs 
concluded that, if a program of mass privatization were implemented, the level 
of FDI activity would significantly increase. 
Kenneth Froot concluded by  noting that FDI cannot be counted on as an 
engine of growth in the near term in Eastern Europe and Russia. He observed 
that, historically, foreign firms have invested only in developing countries that 
have already demonstrated a consistent pattern of  growth. 